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When Extremes Meet: Redistribution in a Multiparty Model with
Di¤erentiated Parties
This version: 17 August 2016
Abstract
In this paper we consider a multi-party electoral competition model in which parties which care
both about implemented policy and their electoral performancestrategically promise a redistribution
scheme while their social ideologies are considered to be known and xed (di¤erentiated parties). Voters,
who di¤er both in income and in social ideologies, vote sincerely for the party that they cumulatively
like most (that is, taking into account both the redistribution scheme proposals and parties social
ideologies). Formal analysis of this game uncovers a moderates-vs-extremists equilibrium: parties with
moderate social ideologies tend to favor generous redistribution in order to capture the votes of the poor
majority, while parties with extremist social ideologies are more likely to be non-competitive in the
economic dimension by proposing policies that do not reect the interests of the poor. An implication
of this result is that, ceteris paribus, an increase in income inequality should lead to an increase in the
cumulative vote share of moderate parties and, hence, in a decrease in party-system fragmentation.
Keywords: redistributive politics, taxation, di¤erentiated candidates, policy motives, social polar-
ization, multi-party elections.
JEL classication: D72, H20
1 Introduction
The relationship between social ideologies and redistributive outcomes has recently received re-
newed attention mostly in the context of two-party elections (e.g., Krasa and Polborn 2012, 2014).
The main idea in this literature is that if parties are less exible in determining their platforms as
far as social issues are concerned compared to their redistribution promises, then voterspreferences
on social issues should be relevant in determining which redistribution schemes parties promise.
We would like to thank the participants at various seminars at the University of Warwick, the University of Rochester, the
2013 Annual MPSA Conference, the 2013 APSA Annual Conference, and the 2010 Public Economics UK Annual Conference,
for useful comments and suggestions. Konstantinos Matakos would also like to thank Bhaskar Dutta and Ben Lockwood
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Lindbeck and Weilbull (1987), Dziubinski and Roy (2011), Krasa and Polborn (2012, 2014) and
Matakos and Xefteris (2016) consider two-party models such that parties have xed positions
on the social ideology dimension and promise redistributive schemes (or public goods) in order
to improve their prospects of success in forthcoming electionsand show that indeed equilibrium
redistributive schemes are sensitive to changes in the distribution of voterssocial ideologies. In
these models parties generally end up promising identical redistribution schemes1 and these re-
sults are perfectly robust to considering that parties may be partially policy motivated. This is so
because since Calvert (1985) we know that when only two parties compete, a party may a¤ect the
implemented policy to its satisfaction only by increasing her vote share: o¢ ce and policy motives
are aligned to a great extent.
On the contrary very little is known regarding how redistribution promises should look like
when many di¤erentiated parties take part in electoral competition. Does it still hold that all
parties will want to o¤er the same redistribution scheme as in two-party systems? Do equilibrium
redistribution promises depend on whether parties have policy preferences or not? In case parties
o¤er in equilibrium distinct redistribution schemes, which parties should be anticipated to promise
more generous redistribution? Which parties should be expected to favor less generous redistrib-
ution schemes? Moreover, since equilibrium existence and uniqueness arguments are not always
straightforward in such di¤erentiated candidates games even in the two party case (Matakos and
Xefteris 2016; Xefteris 2015)what happens when more than two parties (or candidates) compete?
For instance, is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium likely to exist?
In this paper we try to answer these questions by studying a model of electoral competition
under the simplest possible electoral rule (plurality) among four parties which have xed and
known social ideologies and which strategically promise a redistribution scheme in order to a¤ect
both policy outcomes and their vote share. Each voter has well-dened preferences both regarding
partiessocial ideologies and about partiesredistributive schemes and votes for the party which
o¤ers the bundle that the voter likes best, exactly like in the papers that we already discussed.
1Krasa and Polborn (2014) show that if each party is characterized by a distinct public good generation technology, then
partiespromises need not converge. In the case of identical technologies though their model predicts convergence to the
same platform as the rest of the literature.
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That is, the main di¤erence of our approach compared to the previous ones is that we consider a
larger number of parties and more general objective functions.
Considering that partiessocial ideologies are symmetrically distributed about the center of the
policy space we uncover a strong moderates-vs-extremists result: the two socially extremist parties
meet in promising no redistribution at all while the two moderate parties promise generous redis-
tribution. That is, in multiparty systems, socially moderate parties tend to o¤er economic policies
that benet the poor and socially extremist parties tend to promise economic policies that do not
reect the interests of the poor. The intuition behind our main result is as follows. Since Dixit and
Londregan (1995, 1996) we know that, in the context of two-party electoral competition, parties
have an incentive to woo the poor voters by promising generous redistribution because their votes
are relatively cheaper to buy.But in the context of bidimensional multiparty electoral competi-
tion, where parties also care about the implemented social ideology, a new dynamic arises: socially
extremist parties have strong incentives to behave strategically in order to bring the implemented
social ideology closer to their own. As a result, an extremist party promises in equilibriuma
less generous redistribution scheme compared to the socially moderate ones in order to avoid
cannibalizing the vote share of the moderate party with which it has closer ideological a¢ nity on
the non-economic dimension.
The prediction that socially extremist parties propose economic policies that do not reect
the interests of the poor majority is arguably intriguing and should be treated with caution in
order to avoid misinterpretations. When the majority of voters is relatively socially moderate
and socially moderate parties propose popular and similar economic platforms, socially extremist
parties know that: a) they cannot win, independently of the economic platform that they propose,
and b) their strategy can inuence only the implemented social policy by a¤ecting which of the
two moderate parties ranks rst in the election. Hence, they choose unpopular economic platforms
in order to bring the implemented social policy as close as possible to their ideal one. In a sense,
socially extremist parties have incentives to be non-competitive in the economic issue and, hence,
3
they endogenously become niche parties.2 Indeed, one could have a more elaborate model in
which parties choose both economic policy and assign di¤erent weights to di¤erent issues, but the
addition of an extra strategic dimension would only complicate the analysis without interfering with
the existing dynamics: extremist parties would still wish to be non-competitive in the economic
dimension.3
This result has several implications at least as far as European parliamentary politics are
concerned. Most European democracies have multiparty systems with two large moderate parties
and a number of smaller and usually nicheparties in the periphery of the political spectrum
that focus on specic policies such as the environment, or the relationship with the EU. Thus
our model helps explain some features of multi-party European politics. For instance, in the 2015
parliamentary election in the UK, in a typical example of a niche party behavior, the strongly
euroskeptic UKIP if one treats partiesposition towards the EU as the second dimension4 run
on a platform of very low taxes and redistribution, while the mildly euroskeptic Conservatives,
under the leadership of David Cameron, run under the platform of one-nation conservatism which
involves considerable redistribution towards the poorer segments of society. Another example
of this type of non-monotonicity in proposed tax policies, predicted by our model, comes from
the Greek 2015 parliamentary election where the two extreme parties (on the pro- and anti-EU
dimension), the populist right-wing Independent Greeks party and the liberal To Potami party,
run on a low taxes platform focusing mainly on issues of European identitywhile the more
moderate ones (on the EU dimension), such as New Democracy and Syriza, proposed relatively
more redistribution (and taxation) and focused primarily on the economy.
Moreover, the qualitative part of this nding socially moderate parties tend to o¤er more gen-
erous redistribution than socially extremist onesis robust to votersand partiessocial ideologies
2Following Meguids (2005) seminal analysis of niche partiesdi¤erences to mainstream ones, Wagner (2012) described
niche parties as parties that compete primarily on a small number of non-economic issues.
3Notice that our results align with the empirical regularity of niche party existence (that is, of parties that do not compete
in the economic dimension) without assuming that these parties actually care about economic policy less than mainstream
parties do. This observation is of independent interest since it establishes a correlation between a partys extremity in
non-economic issues and whether it is a niche party or not.
4 It is worth noting that UKIPs discourse about the EU was centered around the concepts of identity and sovereignty
versus the authoritarianand non-electedBrussels bureaucracy.
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not being absolutely symmetrically distributed about the center of the policy space, to the two di-
mensions being correlated,5 to parties caring to any arbitrarily small degree about the implemented
social policy,6 and to alternative electoral systems (proportional representation). What changes,
of course, is that in equilibrium the two moderate parties win elections with di¤erent probabilities:
if, for example, the socially liberal extremist o¤ers more redistribution but still strictly less than
both moderate partiesthen this will give an electoral advantage to the moderate socially conser-
vative party. As a result, extending the results to cases with such asymmetries allows our model
to provide some insight into electoral patterns observed in many European party-systems. For
example, if extreme socially liberal parties have a oor on their redistribution proposals perhaps
because the two dimensions are correlatedthen our model can explain the right-wing electoral
advantage in Germany (few left-wing chancellors in recent years), France (only two left-wing pres-
idents during the Fifth Republic) and Italy (dominance of the right until the recent crisis). As
a result, our theoretical framework can be useful both in helping us understand the mechanisms
behind the emergence (and electoral success) of niche parties a feature that is quite common in
many European parliamentary democraciesand also in shedding some light into some particular
features of European politics (e.g., the recent electoral advantage of the right).
Since, in equilibrium, both in the symmetric and the asymmetric case, di¤erent parties of-
fer di¤erent redistribution schemes, and, since di¤erent voters have di¤erent preferences regarding
redistribution (which originate form the fact that they might have di¤erent incomes), it is straight-
forward that two voters with the same social ideology need not be voting for the same party: the
share of poor voters that vote for the socially moderate parties is larger than the share of rich
voters who vote for these parties. This observation dictates that the cumulative vote share of so-
cially moderate parties which, in most cases, negatively relates to the fragmentation of the party
systemis correlated with the exact degree of income inequality of a given society. Following the
argument laid by Piketty (2014), take the case of a society where inequality is rising as the income
5 In terms of modelling, as we show in the appendix, assuming that the two dimensions are correlated is similar to parties
positioning asymmetrically in the social ideology dimension.
6 In the extreme case in which parties do not care at all about the implemented policy then, in equilibrium, all parties
o¤er the same platform. Since this convergent equilibrium collapses once one introduces policy motives of any arbitrarily
small degree, we do not nd it necessary to formally investigate this case.
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of the very rich is rapidly increasing relative to that of the rest for simplicity call them the poor
and consider our equilibrium, where moderate parties o¤er more generous redistribution schemes
than the extremist ones. Then our model makes a direct prediction on the exact relationship be-
tween income inequality and the fragmentation of the party-system: party-system fragmentation
decreases with inequality. In the last part of our paper we present some rough empirical evidence
which back up the identied relationship.
The remaining of the paper is organized in the following way: In section 2 we introduce our
theoretical model, in section 3 we present the results of the formal analysis, in section 4 we discuss
empirical implications of our ndings and, nally, in section 5 we conclude.
2 Theoretical model
We consider a model of electoral competition among four parties, taking place in a two-dimensional
policy space. We name those dimensions as social ideology and economic policy, respectively
(see also Stokes 1992; Groseclose 2007; Krasa and Polborn 2012).7 Following the literature on
di¤erentiated candidates (Krasa and Polborn 2010, 2012, 2014; Dziubinski and Roy 2011, Matakos
and Xefteris 2016, Xefteris 2015) we assume a framework, where the four parties di¤er in their xed
social ideology position, while in the second dimension (economic policy) they strategically choose
the tax rate and the implied level of redistributive spendingin order to maximize their utility.
Moreover, in our set-up, parties have mixed o¢ ce and policymotives while the preferences of
the voters in both dimensions are heterogeneous. Finally, both dimensions are continuous.
2.1 Political parties
We formally dene the partiessocial ideology positions in the [0; 1] space as follows:
P = fl; L;A; ag  [0; 1] such that l < L < A < a
7A typical dichotomy in the dimension of social ideology can be, for instance, libertarian vs. authoritarian or socially
liberal vs. socially conservative (e.g., Groseclose 2007). Examples of the rst dimension (social ideology) may include issues
such as: abortion, gun legislation, or same-sex marriage. The second dimension may include policies such as: redistribution,
taxation and government spending.
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where l is the position of the extreme libertarian party, L is the position of the moderate
socially liberal party, A is the position of the moderate socially conservative party and a is the
position of the extreme authoritarian party. These positions are xed and we will henceforth refer
to each party by its social ideology position p 2 P. In order to give more structure to our model
we consider the symmetric case.
Condition 1 (Symmetry) Parties l and a are positioned in the extremes of the social ideology
space, that is at l = 0 and a = 1. Parties L and A are symmetrically positioned at distance 
around the median. That is, at L = 1=2   and A = 1=2 + .
Each partys social ideology position is assumed to be public knowledge. Furthermore, each
party will propose a tax rate which uniquely identies a specic redistribution scheme the budget
must be balanced and, hence, the total amount of redistributive transfers should always equal the
total revenues raised through taxation. Formally, each party p proposes a tax rate tp such that
tp 2 [0;  ] and  2 (0; 1];  is xed and depends on the degree of institutional constraints (e.g.,
scal and monetary policy rules, or central bank autonomy in the case of ination taxes).
We assume that parties care both about their vote share (o¢ ce motives)8 and also about the
social ideology of the winner (policy motives).9 Formally, their utility function takes the following
form:
Vp(!; vp) =  j!   pj+ vp; p 2 P
where vp is the vote share of party p 2 P, and ! is the social ideology related policy that gets
implemented by the winner (or winners), once the electoral result has been realized. To conclude
the discussion, we note that each partys social ideology position p, together with its tax rate
proposal tp constitute party ps political platform, upon which citizens vote.
8One possible justication why parties, especially extremist ones, care about their vote shares is that parties might receive
state subsidies or free broadcasting time in public media both of which are tied to their electoral performance. An alternative
justication, which becomes very relevant in the extension of our model in section 3.5, is that a partys vote share determines
its bargaining power in the allocation of cabinet portfolios in the event of having to form a coalition government.
9We prefer not to consider that the parties have preferences regarding the implemented economic policy at this point in
order to make analytical arguments as easy to follow as possible. After the presentation of our formal results, though, we
argue that our equilibrium is robust to considering that parties care about the implemented economic policy as well.
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2.2 The voters
Each voter is characterized by her social ideology, x 2 [0; 1] (she has symmetric and single-peaked
preferences on social issues), and her income y 2 fm;Mg, with m 2 [0;M) and M <  12   2.10
We consider: a) a continuum of voters; b) a mass of q 2 (0; 1) voters each having income m and
a mass of (1  q) voters each having income M ; and c) within each income group the distribution
of voterssocial ideologies is uniform on [0; 1]. We name the voters with income m poor and those
with income M rich.
We employ a standard balanced-budget redistribution scheme (Meltzer and Richard 1981).
That is, under a at tax rate tp 2 [0;  ]; the average revenue raised is:
T (tp) = tp[qm+ (1  q)M ]; tp 2 [0;  ] such that  2 (0; 1]
This is identical to the individual redistributive transfer. Therefore, the utility of an (x; y)
voter that votes for party p is given by:
Ux;y(p; tp) =  jp  xj +
p
y(1  tp) + T (tp),
where T (tp) is the transfer proposed by party p. The rst component of this expression,  jp xj,
is the disutility that voter x experiences when party p does not share the same social ideology with
her. The second component,
p
y(1  tp) + T (tp), is the utility that voter (x; y) receives from her
disposable income after all taxes and transfersgiven the proposed tax rate tp.11
Then, the resulting utility of income for a poor voter, given transfer T (tp), is given by:
p
m(1  tp) + qmtp + (1  q)Mtp =
p
m+ (1  q)(M  m)tp >
p
m, for tp > 0
whereas, for a rich one it is:
10This assumption only guarantees that the social ideology dimension plays a su¢ ciently signicant role in votersutilities
and, thus no voter votes on the basis of economic policy alone. Since we have assumed a bounded social ideology space [0; 1]
if we place no upper bounds on M , then for very large values of M the signicance of social ideology relative to economic
policy decreases and, hence, the moderates-vs-extremists result might fade. But this assumption comes at no additional cost
as in our modelling decision we could have assumed instead an unbounded social ideology space ( 1;+1) or introduce a
parameter  in the utility function that measures the relative importance of social ideology issues vis-a-vis economic ones.
11We can show that our results can be generalized if one replaces the square root with any twice continuously di¤erentiable
function f() such that f 0() > 0 , f 00() < 0, and f(0) = 0. Those additional results are available by the authors upon
request.
8
p
M(1  tp) + qmtp + (1  q)Mtp =
p
M   q(M  m)tp <
p
M , for tp > 0
Since the LHS of both inequalities is the utility of income after redistribution, while the RHS
is the utility of income when redistribution is zero, we can deduce that all poor voters prefer the
highest possible tax rate  since redistribution takes place in their favour. On the contrary, rich
voters have no preference for redistribution and strictly prefer zero taxes.12
2.3 The voting game
We consider a voting game with three stages. All information is publicly available and known ex
ante to all agents. The solution concept we employ is Nash equilibrium. The three stages of the
game are as follows:
Stage 1: Parties announce simultaneously their complete political platforms fp; tpg. Since tp is
the only strategic choice made by parties, we can rewrite their maximization problem as follows:13
max
tp
Vp(tp; t p) =  j!(v(tp; t p))  pj+ vp(tp; t p)
The winning party is denoted by !. Clearly, the winner depends on the allocation of vote
shares among parties, which in turn depends on their tax rate proposals. Hence, we can express
the winner of the electoral game and the implemented social ideologyas !(v(t)). Formally, we
have !(v(t)) 2 [0; 1], where v is the vector fvpgp2P and t is the vector ftpgp2P .
Stage 2: Voters vote sincerely for their most preferred platform, given partiestax rate an-
nouncements.14 Formally, sincere voting in this setup means that each voter fx; yg solves the
following maximization problem:
12This formulation of preferences, within each group, is exactly equivalent to Grosecloses (2007) one-and-a-half dimen-
sionalpreferences where alternatives are described by two characteristics: their position in a spatial dimension, and their
position in a good-bad [high-low tax rate] dimension, over which voters [of the same group] have identical preferences.
It is also related to Aragonès and Xefteris (2013, 2014) who consider elections between two candidates whose non-policy
characteristics are heterogeneously valued by two distinct votersblocks.
13Given that in the social ideology dimension the position of each party p is xed, we can save in notation by omitting p
from fp; tpg.
14 In our context sincere voting merely implies that we rule out misaligned voting (i.e., voting for a candidate other than
the most preferred one) as in Kawai and Watanabe (2013). In fact, as evidence suggests only a tiny fraction of voters vote for
a candidate other than the one they most prefer (Kawai and Watanabe 2013; Fisher and Myatt 2014) as voters are found to
have a very strong sincerity bias (e.g., Spenkuch 2015). As a result, the assumption that voters vote for their most preferred
platform is consistent with empirical evidence.
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max
p2P
Ux;y(p; tp) =  jp  xj+
p
y(1  tp) + T (tp):
Stage 3: Given voterschoices at Stage 2, each party receives its vote share vp 2 [0; 1] such thatP
p2P vp = 1, and the voting outcome is realized. The party that collects most votes wins (plurality
rule) and implements its political platform. In case of ties, parties do so with equal probability.
We assume commitment. That is, the winner fully implements her announced platform.
3 Equilibrium analysis
3.1 Social ideology dominates
In this section, we analyze the case where social ideology is dominant, that is, we assume thatM <
min
n 
1
2   
2
; 42
o
which, in turn, implies that  is su¢ ciently large and the two moderate parties
are su¢ ciently apart from each other as far as social ideology is concernedand relatively closer
to the extremist ones. That is, from the perspective of an extremist party, there are substantial
ideological di¤erences between the two moderate ones this is what we mean by social ideology
being dominant. First, through Lemma 1, we characterize how partiesvote shares vary with q
and the chosen tax rates. Then, we establish existence and characterize the unique pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium of the game by highlighting the strategic behavior of the extremist parties.
Before presenting our formal results, it is useful to dene the function that measures the
maximum gain in votes for a party, as a function of q and of its tax rate di¤erential (mark-up) with
respect to one of its neighboring parties this will help us pin down the voters who are indi¤erent
between any two parties. First, dene the tax rate di¤erential for a party p as t^p  tp   tp^, for
some neighboring p^ 6= p. Also, to spare on notation, dene   (1 q)(M m) and   q(M m),
and let m^  m + tp^ and M^  M   tp^. Then, for every q; t^p 2 (0; 1] and every m and M , such
that m 2 [0;M) dene:
z(q; t^p)  q
q
m^+ t^p  
p
m^

| {z }
vote gains from poor
  (1  q)
p
M^  
q
M^   t^p

| {z }
vote losses from rich
.
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The rst component is the gain in votes from the poor voters for a party proposing excess
taxation t^p, compared to its opponents proposal. The second part captures the loss in votes from
the rich voters.15 Now we prove the following helpful Lemma that characterizes z(q; t^p).
Lemma 1 The following are true: (i) z(q; t^p) is continuous in [0; 1] and di¤erentiable in (0; 1) for
every q;m; tp; (ii) @z(; t^p)=@tp > 0 for all tp and 8q;m; and (iii) z(q; t^p) is positive if and only if
t^p > 0 (i.e. tp > tp^) 8 p; p^ and tp; tp^ 2 (0; 1]
Function z() can be interpreted as the net gain in votes for party p as a function of its tax
rate mark-up t^p. Clearly, z() is strictly increasing with respect to tp, and positive whenever party
p proposes higher taxes than its opponent (that is, tp > tp^). Hence, Lemma 1 highlights the
incentives that parties have to target the poor voters and go for full redistribution. But then,
do all parties (moderate and extremist) propose the same redistribution schemes? It turns out
that extreme parties can never win, in equilibrium, even if they propose maximum redistribution.
If they propose more tax they can increase their vote shares but, since they can never win, the
implemented social ideology will never coincide with their ideal one. In fact, by proposing more
tax they could be shooting themselves on the foot by causing the victory of the most ideologically
remote (to them) moderate party. As a result, they have incentives to behave strategically. Lemma
2 summarizes this result.
Lemma 2 Proposing tax rate tp =  is a strictly dominant strategy for p 2 fL; Ag (i.e., for both
moderate parties) and, hence, extreme parties (l and a) can never win, in equilibrium.
We can now characterize in Proposition 1, with the help of those two results, the equilibrium
in the case where social ideology is dominant.16
Proposition 1 Let M < min
n 
1
2   
2
; 42
o
. Then, for every q 2 (0; 1), every m 2 [0;M) and
every  2 (0; 1] the following vector t = (tl ; tL; tA; ta) = (0;  ;  ; 0) constitutes the unique Nash
equilibrium of the electoral game in pure strategies.
15Clearly t^p measures the net income transfer to a poor voter, due to taxation, whereas  t^p measures the net income
transfer to a rich one.
16Throughout this paper the term symmetric strategy prole is meant to imply a prole such that the two extremist parties
play the same strategy while the same is true for the two moderate ones (i.e., ta = tl and tA = tL in such a prole).
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This result simply says that when the social issue is su¢ ciently important for voters that is,
M < min
n 
1
2   
2
; 42
o
then there always exists a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies
such that the two moderate parties will propose the highest permitted tax rate  while, the two
extremists meet in proposing zero tax. That is, in our moderates-vs-extremists equilibrium,
the two extremist parties despite the fact that they espouse radically opposite social ideologies
propose identical economic policies in stark contrast with the proposed economic policies of the
more moderate parties which favor the less well-o¤ voters.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. First, due to the diminishing marginal utility of
income, poor voters are more responsive to generous redistribution (the marginal rate of substitu-
tion of income for social ideology is relatively higher for a poor voter). Second, a very high nominal
tax rate does not always imply very aggressive redistribution. In fact, whenever the share of poor
voters q is very low, even for extremely high values of tp, due to the proportional redistribution
scheme, the total redistributive transfer from the rich towards the poor will be extremely mild
(the term q(M  m)tp will be close to zero).17 Hence, the trade-o¤ always works in favor of those
parties that target the poor by proposing more redistribution, irrespective of the size of that group.
In a sense, our result echoes that one by Myerson (1993) on the incentives to exploit inequalities
among voters by making campaign promises that favor weaker groups.
But then, why all parties do not make identical tax proposals in equilibrium in order to
target the poor as Lemma 1 would seem to imply? Lemma 2 provides the answer: even if it
proposes maximum redistribution, an extremist party can never win the election. Instead, it
cannibalizes the vote share of the moderate party which is closer to its social ideology, thus causing
the victory of the more remote in social ideology termsmoderate party which, in turn, brings
the implemented social ideology farther away from its ideal point. That is, extreme parties face
a trade-o¤ between their o¢ ce motives (vote-maximization pushes towards high redistribution
promises) and their ideological (policy) motives which trigger their strategic behavior in an attempt
to manipulate the electoral outcome and the implemented social ideology (policy motives push
17To see this, check that for q = 0 or for q = 1 the total redistribution transfer will always be zero, even if t = 1.
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towards low redistribution promises). Here the assumption about M comes into play: by making
the social ideology dimension more pronounced, it guarantees that any gains in terms of vote
sharesthat extremist parties score by proposing more redistribution cannot be o¤set by the loss
in social ideology termscaused by the victory of a more distant moderate party. As a result,
when the social ideology dimension is su¢ ciently important that is, when M satises the above
conditionand the two moderate parties are expected to be very close as far as their winning
prospects are concerned, extremist parties know that by proposing a higher tax they can only
increase their vote share by a little social ideology matters a lot to the voters. At the same time
though, they are actually helping the moderate party they like the least to win. Given that in
our framework parties also care about the social ideology of the winner (policy motives), extremist
parties are better o¤ proposing no redistribution at all.
Further notice that the equilibrium of Proposition 1 is robust to considering that parties not
only care about social ideology but also about the implemented economic policy. In the pure
strategy equilibrium that we have characterized above an extremist party whichever its platform
choice is can never win the winner of the election is always on of the two moderate parties
and, hence, it cannot change the implemented redistribution in equilibrium. At the same time, if
a moderate party changes its redistribution promise, then it can only cause the other moderate
party to win with certainty. As a result, neither a moderate nor an extremist party can single-
handedly alter the implemented redistribution in equilibrium. In other words, given prole t,
changes in redistribution promises by any party only can inuence its vote share or the identity
of the winner but not the implemented economic policy (redistribution). Therefore, we conclude
that the equilibrium of Proposition 1 is robust to parties having preferences for the implemented
economic policy as well.
While this result appears to be robust and o¤ers a clear picture of the forces that are in operation
in this model, it raises a question. It is often the case that in actual elections not only extremist
parties do not abstain from making generous redistribution promises, but quite the contrary they
try to compete with the more moderate parties in this dimension. Obviously, the special case
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presented above cannot capture this element of electoral competition. Nevertheless, the general
case presented below certainly does so in a more realistic manner.
3.2 General case
One complication of considering the more general case where social ideology still matters but is
not dominantin a game with discontinuous payo¤s, is that an equilibrium in pure strategies need
not exist. As social ideology becomes less important for voters compared to redistribution (and
taxes), the incentives of extreme parties to behave strategically diminish. Proposition 2 generalizes
our equilibrium characterization for the case of mixed strategies and shows existence of a symmetric
mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium for values of M such that M <
 
1
2   
2
.
Proposition 2 For every q 2 (0; 1), every m 2 [0;M) with M <  12   2, every  2 (0; 1], and
every  2 (0; 12), 9   <  such that the following vector  (t) = (l (tl) = a(ta);L(tL) = A(tA))
constitutes a symmetric equilibrium of the electoral game in mixed strategies, where l and 

a are
such that E[l (tl)] = E[

a(ta)] =   <  , whereas 

L and 

A are degenerate strategies that assign
probability one to choosing  .
In an equilibrium where the two extremists employ proper mixed strategies, their tax rate
proposals are, in expectation, strictly less than those of the two moderate ones.18 Nevertheless,
there is still a strictly positive probability that the two extreme parties propose a tax rate other
than zero. In fact, the mixed-strategy equilibrium o¤ers a very intuitive interpretation in the
framework of repeated elections. It can be seen as the frequency with which extreme parties
propose some (non-zero) redistribution.19 When the social issue becomes of little importance (this
is equivalent toM being large enough) the incentives of all parties to make generous redistribution
promises dominate and one can trivially show that, in equilibrium, all parties assign probability
18Notice that, by employing arguments similar to the ones used in the proof of Lemma 2, we can show that parties L and
A still have the same strictly dominant strategies, and, hence, the two extremist parties never expect to win the election.
19Another interpretation of our mixed strategy equilibrium can be that candidate lists of extremist parties are strategically
let to be heterogeneous as far as candidatespositions on economic issues and redistribution are concerned in order to
commit not to tax too much, while moderate parties have homogeneous party lists, which is consistent with Kernell (2015).
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mass almost equal to one arbitrarily close to  .20 That is, in certain realizations, extreme parties
might even propose the same tax rate as the moderate ones. Nevertheless, since we still have that
extremist parties are proposing, in expectation, strictly less redistribution (lower taxation) than
the moderate ones, the qualitative features of the pure strategy equilibrium and the moderates-vs-
extremists nature of our result carry through, even in the more general case.
Finally, let us make two brief comments here. The rst one is related to the assumption that
there are only two classes in our model: rich and poor voters. While this assumption is made
for expositional simplicity, one can see that our general result (equilibrium characterization in
Proposition 2) does not depend on the discrete income distribution that we have employed. By
inspecting the proof of Proposition 2, it becomes clear that our formal argument does not depend,
at all, on the assumption that the income distribution is discrete. As a result, it can be generalized
for a broader class of continuous income distributions.21
The second one relates to the number of competing parties. One might worry that our result
is sensitive on the number of parties that we have assumed. While this is a reasonable worry,
our mixed strategy equilibrium allows us a closer look. Consider the case where  ! 0. Then,
clearly, the condition on M outlined in Proposition 1 is not satised and, hence, the game admits
an equilibrium in mixed strategies like the one characterized in Proposition 2, where moderates
propose full redistribution while extremists mix. On the limit, as  approaches 0, the two moderate
parties are e¤ectively becoming one. What this tells us about how the equilibrium would look like
in the case of three parties? If there is only one moderate party limit case when  ! 0then,
in equilibrium, the limit probability that extremists will assign to strategy  will be equal to
one (lim!0 l () = lim!0 

a() = 1). In such a case, all parties will be proposing the same
redistribution scheme. In fact, this observation helps us unravel a necessary condition for the
emergence of niche parties parties that focus solely on social ideology: it must be the case that
moderate parties are su¢ ciently di¤erentiated as far as social ideology is concerned in order for such
20Formal results which provide a more detailed characterization of the mixed strategy equilibrium in Proposition 2 and
back up this claim are available from the authors upon request. Solely for economy of space we refrain from presenting such
arguments here.
21For a more detailed discussion of this technical point see also Xefteris (2015) and Matakos and Xefteris (2016).
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parties to exist. Otherwise, all parties choose to compete in all dimensions, including redistribution.
3.3 The asymmetric case
So far, we have studied the symmetric case. That is, we have assumed that parties occupy sym-
metric positions over the social ideology dimensionand that the distributions of the two groups
of voters are also symmetric. Yet, one would like to known whether the main qualitative features
of the equilibrium that we have characterized, namely that extremist parties propose less redis-
tribution than the moderate ones, are robust to introducing such asymmetries. In this section,
we briey elaborate on three possible sources of asymmetry: the case in which the poor are more
socially liberal (conservative) than the rich what we call correlated dimensions, the case where
there are more socially liberal (conservative) parties at the one extreme, and the case where some
parties face asymmetric restrictions in the economic dimension and the amount of redistribution
they can propose. Here, we will argue that, as long as such asymmetries are mild and by mild
we mean that tp =  is still a strictly dominant strategy for the two moderate parties and, hence,
Lemma 2 still holdsthen, the qualitative implications of our result will not change in any such
asymmetric equilibrium.
Despite recent evidence that both (socially) liberal and conservative voters reward parties for
increased government spending and redistribution (e.g., Kriner and Reeves 2012), it can be the
case that social ideology conditions voterspreferences for redistribution. For instance, socially
conservative voters might be relatively poorer and, hence, they might prefer more redistribution.
One can try to model this social ideology-dependent (and xed) component of redistribution, by
assuming that the distributions of the rich and poor voters are not symmetric in the [0; 1] interval.
To x ideas further, assume that the distribution of voters is mildly asymmetric. An example is
when the poor are represented by a uniform distribution on [ ; 1  ] and the rich by a uniform
distribution on [; 1+]. Then, depending on the shape of the two distributions (that is, depending
on whether  is positive or negative), one of the two moderate parties would have an advantage
compared to the symmetric case. This would induce a non-symmetric equilibrium outcome.22
22 In the appendix, we explore this scenario in greater detail and we show how an asymmetric equilibrium might look like
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Nevertheless, when  is su¢ ciently close to zero, this will not a¤ect the strategic behavior of the
moderate parties, and, as a result, it will not upset the main qualitative feature of the equilibrium
that we have characterized.
To see why this is the case, notice that it will still be a strictly dominant strategy for both
moderate parties to promise more redistribution in order to increase their vote shares. Similarly,
the two extremist parties will face the same dilemma as before: how many votes will they be willing
to sacrice in order to strategically manipulate the outcome by boosting the chances of electoral
success of the most proximal moderate party? The trade-o¤ faced will be the same in nature. Yet,
this time it is not identical in magnitude for the two extremist parties. As a result, just like in
Proposition 2, the game admits no pure strategy equilibrium. Rather, we will have a non-symmetric
equilibrium in mixed strategies which will involve the two moderate parties choosing pure strategy
 , while the two extremists mix still o¤ering, in expected terms, lower redistribution than the
moderate ones.23
In general, the key point to note when considering any asymmetric case is that, in the spirit
of Lemma 2, our results hold qualitatively if the two su¢ ciently di¤erentiated in the social ideol-
ogy dimension moderate parties notice, though, that  can be arbitrarily smallhave a strictly
dominant strategy to propose maximum redistribution. To see this, consider the case where there
might be many extremist parties on the one side of the social ideology spectrum, but only one on
the other (party position asymmetries). Then, moderate parties will always play their dominant
strategy, while some perhaps allextremist parties, which cannot win in equilibrium, will still
have incentives to behave strategically and propose less than maximum redistribution. Of course,
in this case, it is quite possible that some of the non-winning extremists (on the side that there are
many of them) would rather propose full redistribution, as their actions might not a¤ect the im-
plemented social policy; the actions of some extremist parties will not have an impact on the vote
share and the chances of winningof the moderate parties. Nevertheless, in equilibrium, it would
in a discretized version of our game.
23For a proof of this claim, see the existence proof of the symmetric general case (Proposition 2) and notice that it does
not depend on the symmetry of the distributions of social ideology it only requires that the two moderate parties have a
strictly dominant strategy (in the spirit of Lemma 2) to propose  .
17
be still the case that moderate parties propose full redistribution while, on average, extremist
parties propose strictly less than full redistribution.
Finally, consider the case in which di¤erent parties face di¤erent (i.e., asymmetric) constraints
regarding their redistribution promises. For example, some parties might be constrained by their
founding charters or principles to have a oor in their redistribution proposals, and, hence
those parties might be inclined to propose more generous redistribution than the others. Without
loss of generality, consider the case that socially liberal parties, which tend to represent the poor
voters more often, are constrained by their founding principles to always propose a certain level of
redistribution: that is, there is a oor, p  0, on their redistribution promises.24 As a result,
poor voters might be more inclined to vote for such parties, while the opposite will be true for
the rich ones. Then, following once more a line of arguments similar to the ones presented above,
this will induce a non-symmetric equilibrium in mixed strategies, in which extremists still o¤er,
in expected terms, strictly less redistribution than the moderate parties.25 In general, we can
conclude that the qualitative features of our moderates-vs-extremists result are robust to mildly
asymmetric distributions of voterssocial ideologies, to the existence of multiple extremist parties,
and to parties facing di¤erent (asymmetric) constraints regarding their redistribution promises.
3.4 Comments on the assumptions of the objective functions
In this section, we briey discuss how the assumptions we have made about the smoothness of the
two the policy and the vote sharecomponents of the utility function a¤ect our results. First,
note that both components of a players payo¤ function can be discontinuous in own strategy for
certain parameter values and strategies of the other players. Consider the following examples that
illustrate this point. When the two moderate parties propose  , the payo¤ of extremist party l
in its policy componentis discontinuous when it o¤ers the same redistribution as the rightist
24Assume that apart from the strategic choice tp that each party is making prior to the elections, there is a xed component
l or a which measures this constraint and is asymmetric; that is, it is di¤erent across parties with di¤erent social ideology
(e.g., l > a > 0). As a result, we have tl 2 [l;  ] and ta 2 [a;  ],  > 0.
25Note that the asymmetry in the equilibrium is in terms of the strategies that the two extremists play and, of course,
in the winning probabilities of the two moderate parties (but moderate parties still play their strictly dominant strategy to
propose ).
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extremist party. When the two moderates parties are very similar ( is very small) and extremists
are expected to propose the same tax rate, then the payo¤ of each moderate party is discontinuous
both in its policy and in its vote share component. The latter is true because, for example, starting
from a situation in which both moderate parties propose zero redistribution, when moderate party
L increases the proposed tax rate, is preferred by more poor voters and by less rich ones. When
the social ideal policy of the indi¤erent poor voter reaches the social ideal policy of moderate party
A, the vote share of L exhibits a jump since, from that point on, no poor voter votes for moderate
party A (something equivalent occurs with the rich voters, but the other way round).
Of course, one should stress that not both of these possible discontinuities bring along the
same amount of complications in our formal analysis. Moderate parties have a dominant strategy
() and in every prole in which they both use it, the payo¤ functions of the extremist parties
can be discontinuous only in their policy component. Indeed, when moderate parties propose
the highest possible redistribution it is impossible for an extremist party to win, not to mention
the impossibility of making any type of supporters of moderate parties vanish. Hence, for these
particular strategy proles which are undoubtedly the most relevant onesthe discontinuity in a
payo¤ function might arise only in the policy component, while the measure of electoral success is
quite smooth.
A natural question is, how would our analysis look like if we had instead a less smooth measure
of electoral success: if, for example, parties cared about policy in the same manner they do now
and only the winner of elections was rewarded with some additional utility. In such a case, the
equilibrium of Proposition 1 would be intact: moderate parties would still stick to proposing the
highest possible redistribution since by doing that each has probability 12 to win and get the extra
utility, and also brings the implemented social policy as close as possible to its ideal one; if one
deviates one gets to lose in both fronts. Extremists too have no incentives to propose anything
larger than zero since by doing that: a) they cannot be elected with positive probability (see
Lemma 2), and b) they reduce the election probability of its nearest moderate party, thus, making
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the implementation of a worse social ideology more probable.26
In fact, considering that parties care about vote share rather than just winning makes our
result stronger in three ways. First, since extremists parties can never win when moderates propose
popular policies, a partially policy motivated extremist party has no incentives to propose a popular
redistribution policy when it is partially win motivated. In contrast, when it cares about vote
share, it has certain gains when it does that. Showing that, despite these non-negligible gains in
electoral performance, the extremist party is still (overall) better-o¤ by being non-competitive in
the economic dimension, is arguably more solid than just showing the same result for the case in
which an extremist party has no gains at all from proposing a more popular economic platform.
Secondly, it aligns with institutional characteristics in most multiparty systems: parties usually
receive state subsidies, broadcasting time in public media and other gains depending on their
electoral performance. Hence, it is natural to assume that in such frameworks parties do not care
crudely about winning or not but have incentives to be voted by as many voters as possible, even
if they cannot a¤ect their win prospects. Finally, when moderate parties become too similar,
then it is natural to expect that extremist parties should not want to sacrice their electoral
performance to bring the implemented social policy only a little bit closer to their ideal one. This
is well captured by Proposition 2 and would not hold if parties cared crudely about winning: for
any distance, even an innitesimal one, between the two moderate parties, the strategy prole of
Proposition 1 would constitute an equilibrium making our argument arguably less realistic and
relevant for real world politics.
3.5 Robustness to di¤erent electoral institutions: Proportional rules and coalitions
So far in the analysis we have assumed that the party that wins most votes implements its platform
(social ideology and tax proposal). That is, we have implicitly assumed simple plurality (or the
26Notice that this equilibrium would still exist if, on top of assuming that parties care only about winning, we assumed
that the implemented social policy moves closer to the winners ideal policy in a smooth manner. This is so because: a)
if an extremist deviates from proposing zero, and thus breaks the tie between the moderate parties in favor of the rightist
one, then it gains no probability of winning while it moves the implemented social ideology, from the midpoint between the
two moderate parties, to a location farther away from its ideal one; and b) if a moderate party deviates from proposing the
highest possible taxation it loses both in terms of election probability and it moves the implemented social policy farther
away from its ideal one.
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FPTP rule) and, hence, we have implicitly excluded the possibility of a coalition government
being formed. Instead, we have only briey mentioned in the introduction that our equilibrium
characterization and thus comparative statics results as welldo not depend on the institutional
architecture (the type of electoral rule) because the incentives for strategic behavior and the trade-
o¤ between votes and ideology outcomes that the extreme parties faceare also present in any
other institutional set-up.
In this section, we address these issues directly by examining what happens when we introduce
the proportional rule which, in turn, allows for coalition governments. Before presenting the result,
we need to comment that we will only provide a characterization result that is similar to the one
of Proposition 1. We shall not address issues of uniqueness of equilibrium here, since the aim is to
demonstrate that the equilibrium we have characterized in Proposition 1 can arise even if we vary
the institutional set-up. Then, the comparative statics predictions that we will derive from that
equilibrium will be robust to considering di¤erent electoral rules. To x ideas further, we make
some extra assumptions on the institutions and the process of coalition formation which are in line
with the literature that studies proportional representation systems (see e.g., Austen-Smith and
Banks 1988; Baron and Diermeier 2001; Gamson 1961; Kalandrakis 2014; Laver and Shepsle 1990;
Laver 1998; Riker 1962; Troumpounis and Xefteris 2015).
Assumption 1 If no party succeeds in winning at least half of the votes (that is if vp < 1=2
for all p 2 P) a coalition of parties C P is formed such that Pp2C vp  12 and the policy
implemented is the weighted average of their most preferred policies. That is, !(C) 
P
p2C(vpp)P
p2C vp
,
for p 2 fl; L;A; ag  [0; 1].
Assumption 2 The formateur _p (the party with most votes such that v _p > vp0 for all p0 6= _p) will
always have to participate in the coalition C. That is, _p 2 C.
Assumption 3 Let C be the set of all possible coalitions C that satisfy the above conditions. Then,
the formateur _p will always form the coalition that gives her the highest utility.
The rst assumption is straightforward and very common in the literature of coalition formation.
21
The remaining two are also fairly intuitive. As it is commonly the case, the plurality winner
becomes the formateur and is responsible of forming a coalition (for the electoral benets of the
most voted party in PR elections see Ansolabehere et al. 2005; Snyder et al. 2005; Matakos
and Xefteris 2015). Also since in our model parties care not only about winning or being part
of a coalition but also about social ideology, it is normal to assume that they care about the
outcome that each potential coalition will implement. Hence, the formateur will strictly prefer
to form the coalition that minimizes the distance between its ideal point and the policy of the
coalition. This means that its most likely coalition partners are its spatial neighbors (in the social
policy dimension). In particular, note that, for su¢ ciently large values of  we provide an exact
expression in the appendixthe coalition C that minimizes, in equilibrium, the distance d( _p; !(C))
for the formateur _p is the one that includes the (moderate) formateur and its neighboring extremist
party. We can now state the main result.
Proposition 3 Let Assumptions 1-3 hold and M < min
n 
1
2   
2
; 42
o
. Then, there exists ~
such that for every  > ~, the following vector t = (tl ; t

L; t

A; t

a) = (0;  ;  ; 0) constitutes a Nash
equilibrium of the electoral game inducing a coalition C with the median social ideology outcome
being implemented, in expected terms.
Two brief comments with respect to the equilibrium characterization of Proposition 3 are now
in order. Firstly, we note that this equilibrium need not be unique. In fact, non uniqueness
is not a problem in the following sense: the purpose of this section is to demonstrate that the
identied equilibrium feature (moderates-vs-extremists) is robust to alterations of the institutional
architecture (from plurality to proportionality and coalitions). Since our purpose is to show that
our equilibrium characterization where moderate parties always propose more redistribution than
the extreme onesand the resulting comparative statics analysis do not depend on the choice of
particular electoral institutions, it su¢ ces to show that an equilibrium with those characteristics
exists under proportionality. That is exactly what we have shown in Proposition 3. Issues related
with the full characterization of the complete set of NE for every possible institutional arrangement
(and coalition formation process) are beyond the scope of our analysis. Hence, we defer them for
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future work.
Secondly, the reason that those alterations in the institutional architecture do not a¤ect our
equilibrium characterization is that the main drivers of our result remain intact: the trade-o¤ be-
tween getting more votes (o¢ ce motivation) and altering the policy outcome (policy motivation)
and the strategic behavior of extreme parties that this trade-o¤ triggers. Much like in the stan-
dard case, extreme parties would be again shooting themselves on the foot (by causing a disfavored
change in the policy outcome) if they over-compete with moderate parties on the economic (redis-
tribution) dimension. Of course, Assumption 2 is critical in this respect as it guarantees that the
plurality winner of the election should participate in any post-electoral coalition that is formed. As
a result, extreme parties, once more, act strategically in order to manipulate the policy outcome
and bring it closer to their ideal point (by attempting to alter the winning coalition). Moreover,
the strategic behavior of extreme parties can have an additional justication: it is not only ide-
ological (policy) motivations by inducing the formation of a more favorable to them coalition
but also o¢ ce motivations they can themselves participate in government via the coalitionthat
drive their strategic behavior. Consequently, the trade-o¤ and our point are strengthened further.
4 Empirical and welfare implications
In the previous section we characterized our moderates-vs-extremists result. But what are the
implications of this result on political competition, party-system stability and welfare? Conven-
tional wisdom suggests that an increase in income inequality might lead to greater party-system
fragmentation and increased electoral support for extremist parties. Nevertheless, our formal argu-
ments presented above seem to contrast this view, especially in the context of multi-party electoral
competition.
In order to see this point better, in this section we perform a comparative statics analysis
of our equilibrium. That is, we will examine how electoral fragmentation (or else party-system
fragmentation) varies with changes in the distribution of wealth and the level of inequality (proxied
23
by M in our model)27 within a particular society. First, following Rae (1968) and Laakso and
Taagepera (1979), we need to dene electoral fragmentation in our context. Given vp 2 [0; 1], for
every p 2 P, we dene electoral fragmentation as:
F (v) = 1  P
p2P
(vp)
2:
Then, we calculate the electoral fragmentation index, F (v(t)), as a function of the vote share
allocation that corresponds to the symmetric equilibrium of Proposition 1. Recall that the induced
vote share allocation v(t) = (vl ; v

L; v

A; v

a) takes the following form:
vL(t
) = vA(t
) = 14 +

2+
1
2z(q; ) and v

l (t
) = va(t) = 14   2   12z(q; ).28
Hence, we can compute:
F (v) = 1  2[vL(t)2 + vl (t)2]:
We can, then, rewrite F as a function of q and  :
F (q; ) = 1  2
n 
1
4 +

2

+ 12z(q; )
2
+
 
1
4   2
  12z(q; )2o = 1  z2(q; )  2z(q; )  2C,
where C  (14 + 2)2 + (14   2)2, a constant.
Proposition 4 Let conditions of Proposition 1 hold. Then, electoral fragmentation is strictly
decreasing in economic inequality (that is, @F (q;)@M < 0).
The intuition behind this result is clear. Since, in equilibrium, both parties L and A o¤er
the same tax (redistribution) scheme, it follows that the identity of the (poor or rich) voter who
is indi¤erent between those two parties (denoted by im(tL; tA) and iM (tL; tA) respectively) does
not vary with parties tax proposals tL and tA. For this reason, any changes in the index of
27Following the argument of Piketty (2014), discussions on inequality have centered around the incomes of the rich (top
incomes) as the main driver behind the rise in income inequality observed over the last four decades. That is why, focusing
on M makes sense; an increase in M , ceteris paribus, makes the income gap between the rich and the poor larger, and, hence,
makes the distribution of total income more unequal. Indeed, one could employ more elaborate measures of inequality but
they would complicate analysis without providing additional insights.
28By symmetry of equilibrium note that t^L = tL   tl = tA   ta = t^A =  and, hence, z(q; t^L) = z(q; t^A) = z(q; ). Again,
by symmetry z(q; t^l) = z(q; t^a) =  z(q; t^L) =  z(q; t^A) =  z(q; )
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electoral fragmentation as a result of changes in the income distribution (M) must come through
the shift of votes between the extremist (l and a) and the centrist (L and A) parties in equilibrium
extremist parties propose strictly less taxes than the centrist ones and poor voters with initial
income m strictly prefer more taxes. When inequality is high (M takes large values) aggressive
redistribution is most e¤ective and, hence, centrist parties can increase their vote shares at the
expense of extremist ones which o¤er little or no redistributionby getting the vote of almost all
poor voters who are relatively more responsive to redistribution (see also Dixit and Londregan
1996)at the cost of losing very few rich voters.
Moreover, without making the claim that we provide a comprehensive test of our theoretical
prediction, note that our results also seem to be supported by empirical evidence (Figures 1 and 2).
In Figures 1 and 2, we plot the relationship between income inequality (measured by the popular
Gini coe¢ cient)29 and electoral fragmentation (measured by the Rae (1968) index as detailed
above) or, alternatively, electoral support for moderate parties.30 As one can see, there is a clear
negative relationship between inequality and electoral fragmentation a positive one when we use
the vote shares of moderate parties instead. Thus, our ndings clearly bring into question the often
popular yet not fully backed-up by evidenceview that high income inequality is associated with
high electoral support for extreme (right or left) parties and thus more fragmented and polarized
party-systems (Esteban and Ray 2011).
5 Final remarks
In this paper, we have studied a model of multi-party electoral competition in two dimensions
(economic policy and social ideology) where parties are di¤erentiated. Our equilibrium analysis
revealed a very strong moderates-vs-extremists result which was found to be robust to various
29When there are two income groups, and for any given value of q, the Gini coe¢ cient takes the following expression:
G = M(1   q)=[M(1   q) +mq]   (1   q). Then, it is straightforward to check that the Gini is strictly and monotonically
increasing in M .
30Data on the vote shares of all parties, which are also used to compute the electoral fragmentation index, in 22 OECD
democracies for the period from 1960 to 2007 are taken from the Comparative Political Data Set 1 (Armingeon et al.
2009). The 22 countries include: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
United Kingdom.
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alternative specications considered. The political implications of our ndings are twofold. One
the one hand, our results highlight the fact that socially moderate parties are more likely to pro-
pose more generous redistribution and economic policies that mostly favor poor voters. On the
other hand, our model provided a prediction regarding the relationship between income inequal-
ity and party-system (electoral) fragmentation that starkly contrasts the current narrative that
has extremist parties beneting the most from high income inequality. That is, our equilibrium
prediction, which is not refuted by the data, suggests that it is the centrist and more moderate
parties that tend to benet from increased inequality.
The latter nding, arguably, casts a shadow of doubt to the widely accepted assertion that the
recent rise of extreme right or left parties in many European countries can be attributed solely to
high levels of income inequality experienced recently. This, in turn, implies that additional factors
which might have been overlookedalso can be partially responsible for the increased electoral
success of such extreme parties in many recent elections across Europe. Perhaps reasons related to
some intrinsic characteristics of those party-systems can explain better this phenomenon instead
of rising levels of income inequality. In fact, our model suggests that income inequality certainly
is not the silver bulletwhen it comes to providing an explanation of this recent success of many
extreme parties if anything, our results point to the opposite direction. As a result, we are in
need of alternative explanations that can account for this phenomenon.
Of course, this is not to imply that income inequality is irrelevant to this debate. Rather its
importance might hinge on particular aspects of the party-system such as to name only onethe
ability of opposition parties or special interest groups to place limits on taxation (e.g., Wolton
2014). Consider, for example, the case where constitutionally inscribed scal rules, independent
scal authorities or special interest groups can limit the ability of political parties to choose their
desired redistributive schemes. Then it may be no longer the case that centrist parties can attract
the votes of the poor by proposing generous redistribution, as was the case in our model. Ulti-
mately, the overall e¤ect of income inequality on the structure of the party-system and the chances
of electoral success of extreme parties seems to be ambiguous and, perhaps, depends on a series
26
of other parameters as well as the structural characteristics of the party-system. In light of these
ndings, our work calls for a better understanding of the role of special interest groups in the case
of multi-party elections.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Correlated preferences
In the rst part of the appendix, we examine more carefully the possibility that economic and social
preferences are correlated, and we compactly argue that our moderates-vs-extremists result is still
valid qualitatively (extremists propose lower redistribution compared to moderates). That is, we
assume that poor voters are on average more socially liberal as far as social issues are concerned
and rich voters lean more towards social conservatism (this pairingis obviously without any loss
of generality). Unless stated di¤erently, every assumption made in the main part of the paper
holds in this section too.
Formally, we consider that the social ideal policies of poor voters are distributed uniformly on
[ ; 1 ] and the social ideal policies of rich voters are distributed uniformly on [; 1 +], where
 < 0. To simplify formal arguments we consider a nite approximation of our game in which
parties are allowed to choose a redistribution policy from the set ftl; thg, where 0 = tl < th < 1.
Namely, we consider that parties can either propose low redistribution (tl) or high redistribution
(th). To avoid technical complications and existence of many similar sub-cases, we nally assume
that the parameter restrictions of Proposition 1 hold, that q > 12 , and that  ! 0. That is,
all parameter values are such that each party is strictly preferred by a positive measure of poor
and rich voters to any other party in every strategy prole and such that extremist parties can
never win just like in the main part of our analysis (Lemma 2), while type-symmetric strategy
proles (proles such that moderates use the same strategy and extremists use the same strategy),
generically, result in a certain election of a moderate party and do not involve ties.
We rst notice that tA = th (and tL = th respectively) is strictly dominant for party A (and
L respectively) here as well. This is so, because the arguments in the proof of Lemma 2 do not
depend on the fact that social and economic preferences are uncorrelated. They merely depend
on the fact that the o¢ ce and ideological objectives of the moderate parties are always aligned: a
more popular redistribution policy only brings the implemented social policy (weakly) closer to a
moderates party ideal one. So, in every equilibrium, we have that both moderate parties propose
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th. But what about the extremist ones? Is it true that they they both propose the lowest possible
level of redistribution (tl), as in the no correlation case ( = 0) that we have examined in detail
in the paper? The answer is, generically, no. If both extremist parties propose tl, then we have
that party A wins with certainty and hence party l has incentives to propose th: in such a way
it increases its vote share while the implemented social policy remains unchanged. If l chooses th
then party a also has incentives to propose th since, by doing that, it only increases its vote share
while not interfering with the implemented social policy. But if party a proposes th then party
l has strong incentives to propose tl: in this way it sacrices some votes in exchange for making
party L win and, thus, moving the social policy substantially closer to its ideal policy. Finally, if l
chooses tl, then a has incentives to do the same in order to bring the implemented social ideology
closer to its ideal one at the expense of losing a few votes.
In other words, there is no equilibrium in pure strategies and in every equilibrium it must be the
case that moderate parties propose th while extremists place strictly positive weight to both tl and
th and, hence, they both propose (in expected terms) lower redistribution compared to the moderate
parties. In specic, in the mixed strategy equilibrium, party l places probability  = 4 z(q;t
h)
4
to th and 1    to tl while party a places probability 1    to th and  to tl. That is, unlike
the mixed strategy equilibrium that we characterized in Proposition 2, this time the probabilities
that the two extremists assign to a specic strategy are not identical and, hence, the equilibrium
is asymmetric: the socially liberal party l proposes (in expected terms) higher redistribution than
party a it assigns higher probability on th than tl compared to party ayet still strictly lower
than both moderate parties that propose th.31 In turn, this would imply that, in equilibrium, the
electoral outcome will also be asymmetric: because one of the two extremists will propose more
redistribution, in expected terms, one of the two moderate parties (in this particular example party
L) will have an electoral disadvantage (in expected terms) compared to the other one. Thus, our
results can also speak to recent patterns of electoral disadvantage that were recently observed in
many European countries (e.g., Germany).
31 It is easy to check that, under the assumptions of Proposition 1, z(q; th) < 2 and, hence  > 1
2
.
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Finally, notice that an equivalent mathematical representation of the problem presented above
would have been to assume that the two extremist parties (l and a) occupy asymmetric positions
in the social ideology space such that pl 6= 1 pa, while we still have pl < pL < 12 < pA < pa recall
that, so far, we have assumed that pl = 1   pa throughout the paper. Again, if both extremists
propose tl, then one of the two moderate parties wins with certainty which one depends on the
type of the asymmetryand, hence, one extremist has incentives to propose th. That is, we are
again in the same situation as above and the argument developed there still applies. As result,
we conclude that the qualitative features of our moderates-vs-extremists equilibrium moderate
parties propose, in expected terms, higher redistributionare robust to such asymmetries.
6.2 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Continuity and di¤erentiability of z() are straightforward given that
M < min
n 
1
2   
2
; 42
o
.
For (ii) we rst compute: @z()@tp =
q
2
p
m+tp
  (1 q)
2
p
M tp .
32 Further, observe that @z()=@tp > 0
is equivalent to q
2
p
m+tp
> (1 q)
2
p
M tp . Since q = (1  q) this, in turn, is equivalent to m+ tp <
M   tp () ( + )tp < M  m () (M  m)tp < M  m. The latter is always true for all
tp 2 [0; 1).
For (iii) notice that when tp = tp^ (and, hence, t^p = 0) we have that z(q; 0) = 0 for every
q 2 (0; 1). Given (ii), it follows immediately that z(q; t^p) is positive i¤ t^p > 0 () tp > tp^. This
completes the proof of the lemma.
Proof of Lemma 2. The proof follows three steps. Step 1 is to recall that, by Lemma 1, vote
shares are increasing in tax rates, that is @vp=@tp > 0 for p 2 fL;Ag. Step 2 is to show that
whenever a moderate party A (or L) chooses tA =  (or tL = ), then the extremists (l and a)
can never win, even if they o¤er maximum redistribution. Finally, Step 3 entails showing that
for all  > 0 and every t A (t L), strategy tA =  (tL = ) is strictly dominant for party A (L);
that is, in equilibrium, parties A (and L) will always choose tA =  (and tL = ), and, as a result,
extremists can never win.
32Note that m^ and M^ do not depend on tp, whereas t^ is a linear function of tp.
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To prove the statement of Step 2, w.l.o.g. x tA =  and compute the minimum vote share that
party A can get. Then we compare it against the maximum vote share that party l can get for
any tl. We will show that vminA (tA =  ; t A) > v
max
l (tl; t l) for any t A and every tl; t l. But rst,
we need to show formally that the indi¤erent voter always lies between two ideologically adjacent
parties.
Consider the case that the indi¤erent voter lies between parties l and A; that is, party L receives
no votes. Since we have xed tA =  and vmaxl implies tl =  , the economic dimension is cancelled-
out and parties A and l will split the votes in the interval [0; 12 + ] (the indi¤erent voter is the
equidistant voter at iA;l = 14 +

2). Hence, at most v
max
l  14 + 2 . But, notice that, even if L plays
tL = 0 against tA = tl =  , we have vL = 14+

2  z(q;t^l=)2   z(q;t^A=)2 = 14+ 2 z(q; ). But we know
that z(q; )  pM < min 12    ; 2)	 and, hence, vL > 0; a contradiction. Thus, the indi¤erent
voter always lies between to adjacent parties which, in turn, implies that vmaxl (tl =  ; t l) <
1
4 +

2
(strict inequality). Moreover, notice that, when all parties propose the same tax rate  the economic
dimension is cancelled out, and, hence, we have vminA (tA =  ; t A = ) =
1
4 +

2 .
33 Taken together
they imply that vminA > v
max
l . A directly analogous argument can be constructed for parties L and
a. As a result, the two extremist parties can never win, when parties A and L propose tax rate  .
That is, either party A is the sure winner or party L, or they both win with probability 1=2.
In Step 3 we need to show that party A (and L) have no incentive to deviate from tA = 
(tL = ). This entails an exhaustive case by case analysis when party A (L) chooses tA < 
(tL < ). By symmetry, we only work with party A. Let tA <  . Then, consider the following
cases.
Case 1 : Party A is the sure winner. Then, switching to tA =  results in an increase in
its utility (same outcome but more votes, since by Step 1 we have shown that @vp=@tp > 0 for
p 2 fL;Ag)
Case 2 : Party L is the sure winner. Then, switching to tA =  results in an increase in its
utility (more votes by Step 1 and same or better social ideology outcome, since by Step 2 the
33The indi¤erent voter between parties A and a is at 3
4
+ 
2
while the indi¤erent voter between parties L and A is at 1
2
.
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only possible outcomes are: either party A is the sure winner or party L, or they both win with
probability 1=2).
Case 3 : Parties A and L tie in rst place. Then, switching to tA =  results in an increase in
its utility (more votes by Step 1 and strictly better outcome, since now by Step 2, A must be the
sure winner).
Case 4 : An extremist party (either l or a) is the sure winner. Then, switching to tA =  causes
A to win with certainty (by Step 2 that is the only possible outcome out of the three since for an
extremist to win in the rst place we must have had that both tL;A < ). Hence, this results in
an increase in its utility (more votes by Step 1 and strictly better outcome).
Case 5 : The two extremists (l and a) tie in rst place. This implies that party L o¤ers a tL
that is strictly less than tl. Then, switching to tA =  causes A to be the sure winner (since by
Step 2 that is the only possible outcome). Hence, this results in more utility for party A (more
votes by Step 1 and better outcome).
Case 6 : There is a tie between a centrist (L or A) and an extremist (l or a) party. There are
4 sub-cases: i) fA; ag; ii) fA; lg; iii) fL; ag and iv) fL; lg. Then, switching to tA =  results in an
increase in its utility. In all sub-cases A gets more votes by Step 1 and at the same time it wins by
Step 2 (better outcome). To verify this recall that for L to tie with l (or a) it implies that tL <  ,
hence switching to tA =  causes A to win with certainty.
Case 7 : There is a tie among any three parties. If A is among the winners, then, switching to
tA =  results in more utility (more votes by Step 1 and better outcome, sure winner by Step 2).
If A is not among the winners, then tA =  results in more utility (more votes and better outcome
in expected terms) since it wins with certainty (recall that by Step 2 a tie between L and one or
more extremists implies that tL < ).
Case 8 : All four parties tie. Then, switching to tA =  causes A to win with certainty (Step
1). So, it increases its utility (more votes and better outcome).
Hence, we conclude that strategy tA =  (tL = ) is strictly dominant for parties A (and L).
As a result, we can eliminate all other strategies and conclude that, in equilibrium, it must be that
35
both A and L play tL = t

A =  . But then, the two extremist parties can never win (see Step 2).
This completes the proof of Lemma 2.
Proof of Proposition 1. First, we will show that the proposed equilibrium is the unique sym-
metric NE of the game. Then we argue why the game does not admit any asymmetric equilibrium.
To prove that the proposed equilibrium is indeed a symmetric NE, we need to show that no party
has an incentive to deviate unilaterally from its equilibrium strategy, that is:
8p 2 P, Vp(tp; t p) > Vp(t0p; t p), 8 t0p.
First, we calculate the vote share vp(tp; t p) that each party receives as a function of its strategy
(tax rate proposal) tp, for every tp; t p. To do so, we have to identify the voter who is indi¤erent
between voting for party a or A, A or L and L or l respectively. Then, we can compute the
vote share for each party. Recalling (Lemma 2) that the indi¤erent voter always lies between two
ideologically adjacent parties, dene as im(tA; ta) the position of the poor voter (with income m)
who is indi¤erent between parties a and A when they propose tax rates ta and tA respectively.
Then, the following equality must hold:
 j1 im(tA; ta)j+
p
m+ (1  q)(M  m)ta =  j1=2+ im(tA; ta)j+
p
m+ (1  q)(M  m)tA ()
im(tA; ta) =
3
4 +

2 +
1
2
 p
m+ tA  
p
m+ ta

= 34 +

2 +
1
2
p
m^+ t^A  
p
m^

.34
By analogy, we denote the indi¤erent rich voter (with incomeM) as iM (tA; ta) and the condition
becomes:
iM (tA; ta) =
3
4 +

2   12
 p
M   ta  
p
M   tA

= 34 +

2   12
p
M^  
q
M^   t^A

.
Given that a fraction q of the electorate has income m and the remaining 1   q has M , and
given that the two continua of voters are identical in all other respects, we can then compute the
aggregate indi¤erent voter:
i(tA; ta) =
3
4+

2+
1
2

q
p
m^+ t^A  
p
m^

  (1  q)
p
M^  
q
M^   t^A

= 34+

2+
1
2z(q; t^A)
Then, all voters to the right of i(tA; ta) will vote for party a whereas all voters to the left
of i(tA; ta) and till voter i(tL; tA)will voter for party A. By a symmetric argument a similar
34Here, w.l.o.g. let tp = tA and tp^ = ta, and hence, t^p  t^A  tA   ta.
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analysis applies when we compare the indi¤erent voter between parties L and l. We now compute
the voter who is indi¤erent between parties A and L, which we denote by i(tA; tL). By letting
w.l.o.g. tp = tL, tp^ = tA and t^L = tL   tA an analogous computation as above yields:
i(tL; tA) =
1
2 +
1
2

q
p
m^+ t^L  
p
m^

  (1  q)
p
M^  
q
M^   t^L

= 12 +
1
2z(q; t^L).
The above implies that i(tL; tA) > 12 i¤ tL > tA, i(tL; tA) <
1
2 i¤ tL < tA and i(tL; tA) =
1
2 i¤
tL = tA. In a symmetric equilibrium, by denition, we have tL = tA and t^L = 0 which, in turn,
implies that the indi¤erent voter i(tL; tA) = 12 .
35 Then, we can compute the vote share allocation
for each party as a function of its strategy choice (by symmetry it su¢ ces to do so for parties A
and a):
vA(tA) = i(tA; ta) i(tL; tA) =

3
4 +

2 +
1
2z(q; t^A)
	 12 + 12z(q; t^L)	 = 14+ 2+12 z(q; t^A)  z(q; t^L)	
and, by analogy, va(ta) = 1  i(tA; ta) = 14   2   12z(q; t^A).36
Then observe that the vote share of each party is strictly increasing in its own strategy (tax
rate proposal). That is, @vp@tp > 0 i¤ @z()=@tp > 0, which by Lemma 1 is always true for all p
and 8q;m such that tp 2 [0;  ] with  2 (0; 1]. Hence, the vote share vp for every party p 2 P is
strictly increasing in tp. By Lemma 2 we know that tA = t

L =  (dominant strategy for A and
L). Assume for a moment that, since @vp@tp > 0 for all p, parties a and l also choose t
0
a = t
0
l =  .
Again by Lemma 2, we know that, in equilibrium: i) parties a and l can never win, and ii) parties
L and A tie in rst place. Then, any of the extremist parties (say a) has an incentive to undercut
l (that is, to propose t00a < t0a = t0l = ) and cause party A to win with certainty i¤ :
|{z}
gain from causing a shift in policy outcome
 maxva(t0a = )  va(t00a < )	| {z }
maximum vote loss of a deviation from t0a to t00a
But given tA = t

L =  , we know that 8ta; t a the maximum loss in votes is equal to the
following expression:
maxfva(t0a = )  va(t00a = 0)g = 14   2  
h
1
4   2 + z(q;t^a)2
i
=  z(q;t^a)2 = z(q;t^A)2 = 12z(q; ).37
Further notice that 12z(q; ) <
1
2
p
M < 12 min
 
1
2   

; 2)
	   and, hence, the above con-
straint is always satised with strict inequality. Thus undercutting is always protable (i.e. it
35When tL = tA we have T (tL) = T (tA) and, hence
p
y + T (tL) =
p
y + T (tA) for every q and all y 2 fm;Mg. That is,
the second part of the utility function is always cancelled out.
36Note that, by denition, we have t^A  tA   ta =  (ta   tA)   t^a
37Recall that t^a = t00a   tA =   and t^A = tA   t00a =  . Hence, the last two equalities follow.
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is a strictly dominant strategy for party a) That is, it is true that  > 12z(q; )  maxfva(t0a =
)  va(t00a = 0)g. Since by symmetry, the same also is always true for party l, we conclude that in
equilibrium we must have ta = tl = min ft j t 2 [0;  ]g = 0.
Consider now an equilibrium strategy prole such that ta < tl. Given that tL = tA in every
equilibrium (by strict dominance), it follows that party party A wins with certainty. Hence, party
a has a protable deviation: it can increase ta to ta + ", for some positive " < tl   ta, and
thus increase her vote share without a¤ecting the implemented social policy. That is, such an
asymmetric strategy prole cannot be an equilibrium of the game. By symmetry, equilibria with
ta > tl are also ruled out, and, hence, the game admits no asymmetric equilibria at all. Thus, we
conclude that the unique Nash equilibrium strategy prole is t = (tl ; t

L; t

A; t

a) = (0;  ;  ; 0).
Proof of Proposition 2. Notice that, by employing arguments similar to the ones used in the
proof of Lemma 2, we can establish that parties L and A still have the same strictly dominant
strategies, namely tL = t

A =  . Moreover, w.l.o.g. we can x t

L = t

A =  and restrict attention
to the reduced two-player game G = (Tp; Vp)p2fl;ag, where Tp = [0;  ]. Then, we have a standard
game with discontinuous payo¤s. Observe that in this general case, M need not be smaller than
42. That is, the constraint va(t0a = ) va(t00a)   is not always satised. As a result, undercutting
is not always protable. That is, there exist values of  such that the gain in implemented ideology
() does not su¢ ce to o¤set the incurred loss in the vote share. Hence, the game need not have a
pure-strategy equilibrium.38
Yet, there exist a symmetric equilibrium in mixed strategies. First, note that game G =
(Tp; Vp)p2fl;ag is a symmetric in pure strategies, compact, Hausdor¤ game, since Tp is a compact
Hausdor¤ space. In order to show that game G possesses a symmetric mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium we need only show that its mixed extension G is better-reply secure along the diagonal,
since quasi-symmetry of G follows from the symmetry of G (Corollary 1.3; Reny 1999). Consider
the mixed extension of the game G = (p; Vp)p2fl;ag, where we extend each Vp to  = l a by
38Clearly, ta = tl =  cannot be an equilibrium because a Bertrand-style induced competition will eventually lead to
ta = tl = 0. But this cannot be an equilibrium either because a (or l) can go all the way and promise ta =  since the gain
in vote share max fvl(t0l = )  vl(t00l = 0)g might exceed the loss in utility  that is now incurred by the fact that party L
wins with certainty.
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dening Vp(l; a) =
R 
0
R 
0 Vp(tl; ta)dlda for all (l; a) 2 .
Then, in turn, betterreply security of G implies two conditions: (i) reciprocal upper semi-
continuity and (ii) payo¤ security along the diagonal.39 For (i) we only need to verify that the
sum of the payo¤s of the two parties
P
p Vp(t) is u.s.c. in t on T . Then, by Proposition 5.1 (Reny
1999)
P
p
R
T Vp(t):d is also u.s.c. in  on  and the mixed extension game G is reciprocally
u.s.c. The payo¤ function for party a (and by symmetry l) is as follows:
Va(ta; tl) =
8>>>><>>>>:
 12 + + va(ta; tl), if ta < tl
 12 + va(ta; tl), if ta = tl
 12   + va(ta; tl), if ta > tl
Then, by continuity of vp(tp; t p) for all tp; t p and 8p 2 fl; ag, it is clear that
P
p Vp(t) =
 1 +Pp vp(t) is continuous in t on T . As a result, condition (i) is trivially satised. For diagonal
payo¤ security in mixed strategies we need to show that:
8p;8" > 0; 8 2 , 9 ^p 2 p s.t. Vp(^p; 0 p)  Vp()  ", 80 p in some open neighborhood
of  p.
Clearly, this is always true. To see this pick any prole  = (l; a) such that l = a and
consider party a playing strategy ^a that assigns larger probability to ta = 0 such that ^a(ta =
0) > a(ta = 0). Then, for small perturbations of 0l, close enough to l, the condition is always
satised since there is at most a small loss in expected vote share that can be o¤set by a positive
change in the expected outcome. As a result, since both conditions are satised we conclude
that mixed extension game G is better-reply secure. Hence, 8 the reduced game G possesses a
symmetric Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies (t) = (l (tl) = 

a(ta);

L(tL) = 

A(tA)), such
that l and 

a have nite support on [0;  ] with E[

l (tl)] = E[

a(ta)] =   <  , whereas 

L, 

A
are the degenerate strategies with L() = 

A() = 1. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3. First note that the vector t can induce a coalition that satises
Assumptions 1 to 3. Clearly, as we have shown in Proposition 1 the resulting vote share allocation
v(t) is symmetric, such that the two centrist parties L and A share the same amount of votes and
39 It is easily checked that the condition of payo¤ security is satised even o¤ the diagonal. Hence, the same argument can
be extended to show existence of non-symmetric mixed strategy equilibria.
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tie in the rst place.40 Then, they each become the formateur with probability one-half. Hence,
and for large enough values of , with probability one-half the coalition (satisfying Assumptions
1-3) between l and L is formed (call it CL). Otherwise, a coalition between a and A is formed
(call it CA). Since !(C

L) and !(C

A) are symmetric, the expected social policy outcome that is
implemented is the median policy (1/2). We need only show that no party has an incentive to
deviate unilaterally.
First consider unilateral deviations by parties L and A (by symmetry we need only examine
L). Observe that any t0L 6= tL will cause it to lose votes and cease being a formateur. Then,
party A becomes the formateur with certainty and, for large enough values of  s.t. the condition
 >
 
1
2   
   14 + 2 + z()2   12    is satised, the CA coalition occurs with probability one.41
Clearly, this is not a protable deviation, since dL(pL; 1=2) < dL(pL; !(CA)) implies strictly lower
utility (less votes and worse policy outcome in expected terms). Now, consider an extremist party
(w.l.o.g. take l) and its incentives to deviate from tl = 0. Any t
0
l > 0 will increase its vote share
but it will deprive (as shown in the proof of Proposition 1) party L from some votes. Moreover,
note that the allocation of votes between parties A and a will remain unchanged. As a result,
party A is the sure winner and becomes again the formateur with probability one. This induces
coalition CA, satisfying Assumptions 1-3. As a result, deviating from t

l to t
0
l cannot cause party
l to enter a more favorable coalition (l can never become the formateur). In fact, it gives rise to
a strictly worse coalition (expected social policy outcome of new coalition CA is to the right of
the median and hence, further away from ls ideal policy point 0). Yet, this deviation does give
party l some extra votes. To show that it is not protable we have to compare the maximum gain
in utility from increasing its vote share with the loss of inducing a strictly worse policy outcome.
From Proposition 1 we have: maxfvl(t0l = )g = 12z(q; )
Then, the deviation is not protable if and only if the following is satised:
z(q;)
2 < dl(pl = 0; !(C

A))  d(pl = 0; 1=2) ()
40Recall that we have computed that vL = vA = 1=4 + =2 + 1=2[z(q; )] and vl = va = 1=4  =2  1=2[z(q; )]
41The condition on  is derived as follows: the grand coalition between A and L induces policy outcome 1
2
, and, hence, it is
 away from each moderate partys ideal position. If a moderate party coalesces with an extremist one (CL or C

A coalitions)
then !(CL) = vlpl + vLpL (!(C

A) = vapa + vApA). Then a moderate party would rather coalesce with an extremist one if
and only if  is larger than the distance between pL and !(CL) (pA and !(C

A)) the RHS of the inequality.
40
z(q;)
2 < dl(0; !(C

A))  1=2|{z}
d(pl;1=2)
()
z(q; )=2 < 3=4  z(q; )=2 + 2 + z(q; )| {z }
d(0;!(CA))
  1=2 () z(q; ) < 1=4 + 2 + z(q; )
Since z(q; ) < min
 
1
2   

; 2)
	
, we can always nd an ~ > 0 such that the above condition
is always satised for any  > ~. Hence, the deviation is never protable and t constitutes a Nash
equilibrium of the game. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4. Recall that F (q; ) = 1 2C z(q; )2 2z(q; ). Then, we compute:
@F (q;)
@M =
@F (q;)
@z(q;)
@z(q;)
@M =  2[z(q; )+]12(1 q)

  1p
M
+ qp
m+(m M)( 1+q) +
1 qp
M+mq Mq

:
Notice that M M +mq  Mq  m+ (m M)( 1 + q) for any admissible values. Hence,
1p
M
 1p
M+mq Mq  1pm+(m M)( 1+q) and
1p
M
  1p
M+mq Mq +(1  ) 1pm+(m M)( 1+q)
for every  2 [0; 1], including  = q , and all generic parameter values. Moreover, we have shown
(Lemma 1) that z(q; ) is positive, and, hence, the above derivative is generically negative. That
is, fragmentation is strictly decreasing in income inequality.
41
6.3 Figures 
 
Figure 1.  The relationship between electoral fragmentation (measured by the Rae index) and income 
inequality (measured by the Gini coefficient) in 23 Western OECD democracies (1970-2007). 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The relationship between electoral support (in %) for moderate parties and income inequality 
(measured by the Gini coefficient) in 23 Western OECD democracies (1970-2007). 
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